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With the rapid development of information technology, more and more 
companies introduce dual-channel structure to enhance their competitiveness. And 
under the dual-channel supply chain structure, many corporations apply hunger 
marketing strategy to artificially limit the supply of direct channel, forcing consumers 
to buy products from the retail channel where merchandises have a higher price, in 
order to improve corporate profits. However, few researches have been done to 
simultaneously coordinate both the supply chain management theory and hunger 
marketing strategy. Therefor this paper investigates the hunger marketing strategy of 
dual-channel supply chain. 
Based on linear demand function influenced by price and quality, we build a 
two-stage dual-channel supply chain model. Then we investigate the impacts of 
hunger marketing strategy on supply chain members’ pricing, quality investment 
decisions and their profits under four supply chain structures: vertical integrated, 
manufacturer Stackelberg, retail Stackelberg and vertical Nash. We find that under 
vertical integrated structure, the implementation of hungry marketing strategy not 
only promote manufacturer improving the level of quality investment, but also can 
increase the overall profit of supply chain. But under retail Stackelberg and vertical 
Nash, only by strictly restricting the supply of direct channel can they enhance the 
product quality and overall efficiency of supply chain. 
In addition, we characterize the risk appetite of retailer by mean-variance 
analysis method, further discussing the effect of retailer’s risk-averse behavior on 
dual-channel supply chain optimal decision. The results show that under the vertical 
integrated structure, retailer's risk-averse behavior will reduce the quality investment 
of manufacturer. Conversely, manufacturer’s quality investment increases along with 
the growth of retailer’s risk aversion under decentralized supply chain. Moreover, 
retailer's risk-averse attitude would damage its utility, while risk-neutral manufacturer 
can take advantage of retailer’s risk-averse weaknesses to obtain a higher level of 
effectiveness. 
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（CNNIC）发布的《第 37 次中国互联网络发展状况统计报告》以及《2014 年中
国网络购物市场研究报告》显示，我国网络购物市场依然保持着稳健的增长速度。
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商 Stackelberg 博弈以及权力对等的 Nash 博弈三种不同权力结构下的定价策略，
为后面的学者对于此方向的研究提供了参考的范式[22]。Yao 和 Liu（2005）分别
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